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Hume’s thoroughgoing religious scepticism is set within the context of the
Scottish Enlightenment. Against some interpreters, it is argued that, although
elusive, his ‘attenuated deism’ (Gaskin) is not wholly dismissive of all forms
of religious thought and practice. His position is further compared with
contemporary expressions of ‘new atheism’. Despite some obvious similarities,
Hume’s position is judged more nuanced both in terms of content and rhetorical
strategy.
Key Words: Hume, God, religion, scepticism, atheism, deism
In narrating the final illness of Hume, Adam Smith records a conversation in
which his friend reflected upon the reasons why he might wish to delay his journey
across the Styx. He tells Charon, the ferryman, that perhaps he might correct his
works for a new edition. This is dismissed as an excuse. Finally, he asks for time
to see his work dismantle the prevailing systems of superstition. The boatman
then loses his temper. ‘You loitering rogue’, he says, ‘that will not happen these
many hundred years. Do you fancy I grant you a lease for so long a term? Get into
the boat this instant, you lazy loitering rogue’ (Hume 1935: 245).
At a distance of three centuries, we can offer some assessment of the ways
in which Hume challenged superstition and indeed what he might have intended
by this late remark to his friend. Associated for much of his life with the city
of Edinburgh, Hume became the doyen of the Scottish Enlightenment during the
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second half of the 18th century. Today he is regarded as the greatest philosopher to
have written in English. Yet within his native context, he was also an exceptional
figure by virtue of his views on religion. In Scotland, the Enlightenment was a
movement that flourished on Presbyterian soil, many of its leading figures being
clergy such as Robertson, Blair, Ferguson and Reid, who distinguished themselves
in fields other than theology. By contrast, Hume took a view on religion that
was neither heterodox nor indifferent but explicitly hostile in important respects.
He was attacked by the clergy on numerous occasions; some of it was vicious
and vitriolic, including that of James Beattie, the Aberdeen philosopher, later
memorialized in Joshua Reynolds’ painting ‘The Triumph of Truth’ (Beattie
1773).2 Never offered an academic position, Hume even endured an attempt
to have him excommunicated from the Kirk in 1755–56. Boswell famously
described him as ‘the great infidel’, an epithet that has since stuck. (Graham
2006). In recent times, he has been valorized by the new atheists as one of their
own, a critic of religion who helped to turn the tide of reason against superstition.
In what follows, I shall present Hume as a sceptical naturalist, his views on
both the practice and theory of religion being largely negative. Yet, while much
of Hume scholarship today presents him as more explicitly atheist and dismissive
of religion than he was able to appear in 18th century Scotland, I shall make three
further claims that modify this reading. 1. The question of God was never closed
for Hume. 2. The existence of an intelligent creator was not a possibility that he
judged capable of elimination. 3. There is a minimal form of theism and religious
observance that he regarded as benign and even socially useful. In light of this,
some comparisons will be drawn with today’s new atheists who regard Hume as
their patron saint.
Hume wrote repeatedly on the subject of religion throughout much of his
life. Although the material can readily be assembled into a single volume of
writings, it covers a broad range of topics (Wollheim 1963; Baggini 2010). Almost
everything he had to say on the subject remains of significance today whether in
its philosophical, social-scientific or historical study. It is clear, moreover, that his
writings on religion were of much importance to Hume himself. He was willing
to suffer public hostility on account of his views, even if at times he took steps
to conceal the real extent of his scepticism. Shortly before his death, he added
further material to the manuscript of the Dialogues, while also making provision
for their posthumous provision. Some have judged this work to be a philosophical
masterpiece.
We teach our students that Philo is generally the mouthpiece for Hume, his
scepticism throughout the conversation largely representing that of the author. Yet
Philo’s own position becomes curiously ambivalent in the penultimate paragraph
of the Dialogues where he appears to leave open the possibility of a residual
theism. Is this merely a dramatic device to conceal the author’s convictions, or is
Hume making a more serious philosophical move that prevents us from labelling
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him an outright atheist, in today’s sense of that term? Commentators have divided
over this issue of interpretation. There are certainly features of those closing
remarks that must be seen as a smokescreen deliberately intended to conceal
Hume’s resting position. At any rate, the claim that he has destroyed reason in
order to make room for faith in revelation must be read in this way. This was
simply a tactical move that enabled Hume to advance a thoroughgoing scepticism
in much of his writings without causing the outright offence and censure that
would have inevitably ensued in much of 18th century Europe.
The use of scepticism to support faith was a procedure that had been employed
by different French writers, notably Montaigne and Pascal. It was a strategy
that could be utilised to support the authority of the church over individual
interpretations of Scripture, or more widely to set faith over reason (Penelhum
2008). But the same device could also be used as a convenient means of disguising
the real extent of one’s scepticism, at a time when wholesale criticism of religion
would have had deleterious consequences. Terence Penelhum notes that Bayle’s
Historical and Critical Dictionary of 1697 with its combination of ‘phenomenal
learning, sceptical argument, and cynical cunning . . . provided a mine of anti-
religious ammunition’ for Hume and other Enlightenment figures (Penelhum
2008: 330). Some of the most explosive material in Bayle is reserved for his
footnotes. Again something similar occurs in Hume’s Natural History, where the
attack on the religion of his own day is sometimes more apparent in footnotes and
citation. So the rhetorical strategy of Bayle is deployed by Hume. Cast doubt on
all popular forms of religion by subjecting these to tests of reason and evidence,
but insist simultaneously that true faith must repose upon revelation. Hume had
no intention of developing a theology of revelation, but this putative commitment
provided him with a smokescreen behind which he could rehearse his arguments
against natural theology.
A further tactical motive may have been Hume’s resentment towards those
such as Hutcheson and Leechman who represented the more liberal wing of the
national Church of Scotland, but whose opposition to his appointment to the
Edinburgh chair in 1745 proved decisive. Within Scottish Reformed theology,
there had been a struggle since around 1700 between those who insisted upon
an orthodox theology derived more or less exclusively from Scriptural revelation
and ‘new light’ thinkers who expressed much greater confidence in the powers of
human reason leading to more heterodox emphases (Hazlett 1993). While heavily
revisionist in their views on the Westminster Confession and more indebted to
classical thinkers, especially the Stoics, this latter group within the Kirk had failed
to support Hume’s candidacy for the Edinburgh chair. James Harris has argued
that Hume’s preference for a ‘Calvinist rhetoric’ in much of the First Enquiry can
be explained by his rejection of the providential Deism of this latitudinarian group
within the Kirk. So Hume’s veiled criticism of a rational approach to theology
is not intended to provide support for the evangelical party within the Kirk,
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only to point to the serious inadequacy of the moderate alternative (Harris 2005;
Stewart 2002).
Even allowing for such tactical manoeuvres, Philo’s remarks remain puzzling
especially when one considers these to have been late additions, inserted shortly
before Hume’s death. ‘[T]he whole of natural theology. . . resolves itself into one
simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, that the
cause or causes or order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to
human intelligence’ (Hume 1935: 227). Does this simply reduce religious belief
to a point where it has to vanish altogether, thus requiring that we view Hume as a
thoroughgoing agnostic? This was expressed by T. H. Huxley, ‘Darwin’s bulldog’,
just over a century later. ‘[I]f we turn from the Natural History of Religion, to the
Treatise, the Enquiry, and the Dialogues, the story of what happened to the ass
laden with salt, who took to the water, irresistibly suggests itself. Hume’s theism,
such as it is, dissolves away in the dialectic river, until nothing is left but the
verbal sack in which it was contained.’ (Huxley 1879: 146) This seems nearly but
not quite right.
The closing remarks of Part XII of the Dialogues are neither a volte-face
nor entirely a concealment of Hume’s final position. For one thing, it accords
with views that have already been developed in the Dialogues and elsewhere.
The order of the universe, particularly its organic life forms, is mysterious and
apparently in need of explanation. At least, it is not wrong to consider whether
there might be an explanation. The Epicurean hypothesis, even though flagged
as an alternative hypothesis in the Dialogues, is described by Philo as ‘the
most absurd’ (Hume 1935: 182). We know that in animals and human beings
organisation is accompanied by intelligence. So it remains a possibility that
something akin to human intelligence is the source of order in the universe, and
this we might call God. Is this consistent with characteristic Humean scepticism?
Given the qualifications surrounding the claim, it seems that it is. While the
theistic hypothesis is possible, it is difficult to attach a particular weight to
its likelihood. Hume insists that we cannot get into a position to pronounce
its probability, since we have had no experience of such an intelligence. The
analogies, moreover, must be remote, given the inevitable differences between any
distant cosmic mind and those of human beings whose intellects are determined
by and directed towards the conditions of physical and social existence. Finally,
while intellect appears to offer some possibility for an analogical inference, this
cannot be said of other attributes attaching to human life, notably moral ones. The
residual theism at the end of the Dialogues is amoral.3 The analogy, Philo insists,
cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of
the mind. So even if God exists in some inaccessible region, we cannot assume
that God would have any moral concern with the world. The evidence indeed
suggests quite otherwise, rather than requiring our suspension of judgement. This
also explains why Philo regards himself as moving to much stronger ground when
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the Dialogues turn from cosmic order to consider the problem of evil in Part X.
‘It is your turn now to tug the labouring oar, and to support your philosophical
subtilties against the dictates of plain reason and experience.’ (Hume 1935: 202) It
is a tacit recognition that with respect to the possibility of there being some cause
of cosmic organisation, Cleanthes has raised a significant question that cannot
readily be dismissed. His position is not as hopeless as that of Demea.
Hume’s final position on natural theology is therefore a nuanced one. True
religion reduces to our giving a degree of intellectual assent to the proposition
that ‘God exists’, although it cannot ever be clear what this entails. This is the
only form of ‘worship’ that Hume will allow. Anything else is superstitious
and debasing of our character. The consequence of this is that all practical
manifestations of religion are called into question. The God whose probable
existence is conjectured cannot be God as ordinarily understood. Therefore, a
rational religious belief will have no possible bearing on human life. To this
extent, all real (i.e. actual) religion is without intellectual foundation and, for other
reasons, much of it is considered by Hume to be superstitious or fanatical.4 While
pleading for temperance and tolerance in matters of religious debate, some of
his jibes display a mocking tone which is hardly surprising given the treatment
meted out to him by his opponents. His famous quip about the miracle by which
the principles of understanding are subverted is one of several sarcastic sallies
against the faithful (Hume 1978: 131) This of course suggested the title of J. L.
Mackie’s Miracle of Theism, perhaps the most consistently Humean work in
modern philosophy of religion (Mackie: 1982). Yet Hume’s concluding remarks
in the Dialogues suggest an aporia with regard to the enquiry into cosmic order. It
yields a scepticism that confesses intellectual defeat. This may have quite similar
practical outcomes to more explicit forms of early 21st century atheism, but its
tonality, as I shall later suggest, is less complacent and strident. The question of
God is neither a pseudo-question nor one that is readily dismissed by Hume. The
position he adopts is a counter-cultural contestation of key social tenets, yielding
the possibility of a bare theism lacking any apparent practical value. But this is
not the confident default setting of an established tradition, too readily dismissive
of the claims of religion.
If this characterisation of Hume’s theological position is correct, then it might
be viewed as belonging at the far end of the spectrum of deist positions that were
advocated in the 18th century. ‘Deism’ is a portmanteau terms that refers not so
much to a single school of thought, owing allegiance to any one writer or body of
literature; instead, it denotes a range of Enlightenment views which tend to rest
upon natural rather than revealed theology, and to maintain elements of Judeo-
Christian beliefs about creation, providence, ethics and the afterlife. At one end
of the spectrum, it is an etiolated version of Christian orthodoxy, as in the case of
some of the moderate clergy in Scotland. At the other end – shorn of providence,
ethics, and the afterlife – it shades into scepticism and a practical atheism. This
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appears to be where Hume ends up in the Dialogues. Indeed, it may well be a
settled position held over many years. In the essay on providence in Section XI of
the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, he had already written.
All the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the religion, which is
nothing but a species of philosophy, will never be able to carry us beyond
the usual course of experience, or give us measures of conduct and behaviour
different from those which are furnished by reflexions on common life. No
new fact can ever be inferred from the religious hypothesis; no event foreseen
or foretold; no reward or punishment expected or dreaded, beyond what is
already known by practice and observation. (Hume 1975: 146)
Gaskin describes Hume’s settled position as an ‘attenuated deism’ although
this might be further qualified by describing it as a tentative attenuated deism
(Gaskin 1978: 223).5 Against this, Simon Blackburn has argued that the vague
commitment at the close of the Dialogues constitutes an ‘inert proposition’ or
‘bare claim’ that is without content. ‘[I]t suggests no enquiry, and interacts with no
desires or emotions, and guides no practices.’ (Blackburn 1999: 4) The affirmation
of Philo is thus hollow, Hume having conceded nothing. In this poker game,
there is only one winner who takes all. Blackburn claims that Kant and William
James refused to pay up while Wittgenstein simply changed the rules of the game.
But is Philo’s proposition entirely inert? Certainly, it has no moral relevance for
Hume, but it does seem to place a question mark against the very existence of
an organised cosmos. The universe might have an explanation; or, at any rate,
we could reasonably say that the absence of any explanation would be a puzzle.
One outcome of this train of thought is that natural science cannot deliver all the
answers. At least, it seems that there will be some residual questions remaining
after science has done its explanatory work. To that extent, Hume’s agnosticism
is less self-confident and exclusive of possibilities than some species of today’s
new atheism.
In his recent work, Daniel Dennett has suggested that Hume would have been
bolder in his affirmation of outright atheism had he received the benefit of reading
Darwin. Unable to explain the sources of order in the world, he had finally to
revert to mystery and an appeal to the limits of human knowledge. But with
later accounts of natural selection and genetic mutation, we can now explain
far more in naturalistic ways than Hume realised. Describing the final position
of Philo in the Dialogues, Dennett states that ‘[Hume] caved in because he just
couldn’t imagine any other explanation of the origin of the manifest design in
nature. . . The evolutionary revolution had to wait until Charles Darwin saw how
to weave an evolutionary hypothesis into an explanatory fabric composed of
literally thousands of hard-won and often surprising facts about nature.’ (Dennett
1995: 32–33) In his more recent work, however, Dennett has suggested instead
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that the arguments of natural theology have reached a stalemate and that no
breakthrough should be anticipated. What is more significant is not so much the
Dialogues as the work begun in The Natural History. Perhaps even religion itself
can be accounted for by neo-Darwinian cognitive psychology, thus placing on
a more scientific basis the kind of explanation for religious belief and practice
which Hume had already attempted (Dennett 2007: 27).
To an extent, much of this is valid comment and follows in the tradition of
Huxley’s aforementioned commitment to Hume. Despite the publication of the
Dialogues, the design argument continued to persuade a succession of early 19th-
century writers, including Paley and the authors of the Bridgewater Treatises.
Its intuitive force together with the accumulation of scientific evidence seemed
to make the design hypothesis unassailable to its defenders. By contrast, the
criticisms of Hume were perceived as playful, ingenious and slight. These could
readily be overcome by counter-argument. After the publication of Origin of
Species (1859), however, all that changed. The design argument did not disappear
but it was presented more cautiously, just as the force was more fully felt of
Hume’s earlier criticisms (Flint 1887; Brooke and Cantor 2000: 141–175).
But whether Darwinism would have led Hume to a more forthright atheism
is doubtful. One version of the 18th century design argument is clearly made
redundant by the principle of natural selection, namely the one predicated upon
observation of the matching of species to environment. That camels are equipped
for desert conditions and polar bears for the north pole is explained very well
by Darwin without recourse to the hypothesis of divine providence. Similar
comments might be made mutatis mutandis about the evolution of complex organs
such as the camera eye – these have evolved incrementally as a result of mutations
combined with the outcomes of natural selection. But whether this accounts for all
types of cosmic organisation is less clear. What about the motions of the planets
and the origin of carbon-based life forms? Modern science can give us an account
of their origins in terms of big-bang cosmology but this too reposes upon their
being a universe, or maybe a multiverse, that has the capacity to generate regions
of space-time governed by scientific laws. The givenness of cosmic organisation,
including animal evolution, is not something that is readily explained, at any rate
not to the point of exhausting all the possible ‘why’ questions that can be posed.
Hume’s minimal deism thus remains a valid option, even for a post-Darwinian
philosopher or scientist. To suggest that evolutionary theory must inevitably
yield a full-blown and more self-confident atheism is to miss something of the
subtlety of Philo’s conclusions. Darwin himself did not commit to the full force
of Huxley’s scepticism. He may have lost much of his faith, but it did not lead him
to espouse outright atheism or naturalism. He preferred to leave some questions
open, it seems, even if traditional religious answers had long since ceased to
satisfy. In turning away from orthodox dogma and practice, therefore, Darwin
and Hume may have ended closer to one another, than to Huxley and Dennett.
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Nevertheless, Blackburn and others are surely right that the practical outcome
of the Dialogues is that God exercises no moral influence upon us, nor do
we upon God. This entails for Hume that the claims of revealed theology are
false; ceremonies, prayers, sacrifices, rituals, sacraments, and fasting are either
superstitious or fanatical. A binary opposition thus emerges between a thin
philosophical theism and the actual practices and beliefs of the historical forms
of religion. These depend upon particular beliefs about the divine nature and
our capacity to influence it. Superstition appears in Hume’s mind to be most
closely associated with a religion of external ceremonies and rituals, no doubt
with medieval Catholicism in mind, whereas enthusiasm is largely a Protestant
phenomenon often marked by selectivity and intolerance (Hume 1996: 38–42).
In the Natural History of Religion, there is a fuller discussion of the different
forms of religion, this making it clear why, despite his comprehensive scepticism,
Hume has a preference for the pagan religion of ancient Greece and Rome. With
its plurality of gods, elaborate myths, and anthropomorphism, this polytheism is
more accommodating of diversity and tolerance. Its limited and quasi-human gods
are more like fellow actors in a drama. Its focus on ritual and myth, rather than
dogma, makes it less toxic. This ensures that pagan religion is more apt to produce
virtues such as courage and generosity. By contrast, monotheism is altogether
more grim and demanding; it leans towards intolerance, violence and the servile
virtues. In our increasingly anxious and ingenious efforts to please the Almighty,
we are drawn into all manner of irrational creeds and immoral actions. The long
footnote, quoting Chevalier Ramsay, surely represents Hume’s most bitter attack
upon the religion of Reformed Scotland, including its cornerstone doctrine of
double predestination (Wollheim 1963: 88) With his moderate contemporaries,
he recoils from the violence of the 17th century covenanting period, as is apparent
in more satirical remarks from the History of England.
Great were the rejoicings among the Scots, that they should be the happy
instruments of extending their mode of religion, and dissipating that profound
darkness, in which the neighbouring nations were involved. The general
assembly applauded this glorious imitation of the piety displayed by their
ancestors, who, they said, in three different applications, during the reign of
Elizabeth, had endeavoured to engage the English, by persuasion, to lay aside
the use of the surplice, tippet, and corner-cap. The convention too, in the height
of their zeal, ordered every one to swear to this covenant, under the penalty
of confiscation; beside what farther punishment it should please the ensuing
parliament to inflict on the refusers, as enemies to God, to the king, and to the
kingdom.’ (Hume 1983: Vol. 5. Chapter 56)
Another notable feature of the Natural History is the way in which it undermines
a central tenet of deism (Bell 1990: 9). The assumption that there is a single
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natural religion common to all people is a premise of much deist writing in
the 18th century. To this extent, deism is a project of recovery. By nature, we
own a religion that is rational and ethical, and roughly commensurate with the
findings of natural theology. This pure faith, however, has been overlaid with
the superstitious claims and practices which have flourished for many centuries.
By weeding these out, we can return to a common religion that is natural and
self-evident. A consensus gentium will hence be established across confessional
division. But the historical work undertaken by Hume is sufficient to cast serious
doubt on the proposition that there is a single, natural and monotheistic religion
underlying all of the religious traditions of the world. The essentialist concept of a
natural religion is no longer tenable. The historical contextualising of all religious
forms thus threatens a key motivational commitment of deism.
Hume does not appear to have favoured a mitigated scepticism in matters
of religion, as he did with respect to other types of belief. There is no natural
tendency towards belief in this domain. Morality is independent of religion and
is distorted by its intrusion. Gaskin argues that despite some similarities religious
belief cannot be construed as a natural belief in Hume (Gaskin 1978: 120–126). It
is neither universal nor is its absence practically self-defeating, as for example,
in the case of belief in the external world or other minds. Although it is a
strong impulse, the religious is secondary rather than primary. This raises the
further question as to whether Hume hoped for a society without religion. Does
he explore the idea of a secularised society in which religion has altogether
disappeared? Could a Humean perspective be embraced by every citizen?
Hume’s views on superstition and enthusiasm when combined with his
commitment to a naturalist ethics appear to render a negative verdict upon most
historical forms of religious belief and activity. Yet there are themes in his writing
elsewhere which suggest a more nuanced position. Although not arguing for
religion as a natural belief, he seems to assume that in practice all societies will
be religious in complexion, even while this takes diverse forms. In the History of
England, a model of establishment is advanced which shows a preference for an
Anglican via media that resonates with Hume’s views in other contexts (Jordan
2002). The preferred form is a state religion released from the worst superstitions
of the middle ages, retaining many of its ceremonies, clerical orders and sensual
forms of worship, and maintaining a lower level of doctrinal commitment, after
a cooling of the temperature raised by the divisive dogmas of the Reformation.
Hume appears to believe that this is most likely to facilitate social harmony and
civility when accompanied by state regulation, funding and a high commitment
to religious tolerance. At any rate, this is his declared preference in the History of
England.
Was Hume seriously committed to this proposal? It is certainly a position that
is argued, as opposed merely to being presented. The detail advanced in support of
this model, the implied criticism of Scottish Reformed ideals, and the difference
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from the more disestablished type of church-state relation favoured by Adam
Smith might suggest that it was his preferred position rather than another instance
of diplomatic concealment. It was not simply a pragmatic or tactical response to
appease a religious readership. Referring to the Elizabethan settlement, he writes.
The ancient liturgy was preserved, so far as was thought consistent with the
new principles: Many ceremonies, become venerable from age and preceding
use, were retained: The splendour of the Romish worship, though removed, had
at least given place to order and decency. . . And the new religion, by mitigating
the genius of the ancient superstition, and rendering it more compatible with
the peace and interests of society, had preserved itself in that happy medium,
which wise men have always sought, and which the people have so seldom
been able to maintain. (Hume 1983: Vol. 4, Chapter 40)
In other respects, it accords with his historical claim that religion appears to be
a feature of all civic life, as well as his general preference for public ceremony
and ritual over against highly particular dogmas that tend to be fiercely contested.
Under a sacred canopy of a church regulated and sponsored by the state, religion
is most likely to be rendered cohesive and benign in its effects. Doubtless, Hume
as a sceptic sought only a national church that was moderate, latitudinarian and
undemanding of citizens. But this is rather different from Smith’s more American-
style model of a neutral state for a society populated by different confessional
bodies, none of which is given political preference.
This resonates with other remarks that Hume makes in the Dialogues and
elsewhere. There is a ‘true’ religion which is regulated by the calm passions.
This is supportive of our natural moral impulses and can be evoked by a sense
of wonder at the universe. Hume denotes this ‘true’ religion not so much because
he believed it with any conviction, but because it was plausible, worth tolerating
and even promoting over other more toxic forms. This might explain why the
theological distance between Cleanthes and Philo appears to diminish somewhat
in the closing stages of the Dialogues, as if these are the outcome partly of
temperamental differences between friends.6
Genuine piety is described in the following manner in an unpublished draft
introduction to Volume II of The History of England. Here Hume seems to be
referring not so much to his own position as to a benign form of religion that is to
be encouraged over against its alternative.
The proper Office of Religion is to reform Men’s Lives, to purify their
Hearts, to inforce all moral Duties, & to secure Obedience to the Laws and
civil Magistrate. While it pursues these useful Purposes, its Operation, tho’
infinitely valuable, are secret & silent; and seldom come under the Cognizance
of History. (Mossner 1954: 306)7
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Hume’s particular attacks on religion are unsettling and profound, precisely
because the ground had already been prepared for this in his general philosophy.
The Treatise says little about God, but precisely in doing so it offers an account of
the natural and social world that has no need of theology. Alexander Broadie
has pointed out that the Natural History of Religion could have been added
almost seamlessly to the argument of the Treatise (Broadie, 2009: 187). Hume’s
mitigated scepticism has no role for God either in terms of its explanatory
framework or its practical outworkings. The business of life can be conducted
well, perhaps even better, without much reference to the divine. It is for this reason
that the most interesting response to Hume was not George Campbell’s reply
to the essay on miracles or the later efforts to rehabilitate the design argument,
however worthy though these were. Thomas Reid’s more widespread effort to set
philosophy on a different basis was the most creative and constructive response
to Humean scepticism in the Scottish Enlightenment. The attempt to offer an
alternative account of our most deep-seated convictions about knowledge, the
nature of the self, the external world, and the objectivity of moral and aesthetic
values showed how much would be required if a satisfactory response was to be
made. While Reid makes little effort in arguing specifically for divine existence
through any one argument, he constructs a philosophy of the intellectual and
active powers that lends itself more readily to theistic claims.
Two comments might be made about this approach. First, it shows that if one
allows the role of God to be squeezed into a tightly demarcated religious province,
then the design argument is unlikely to be very persuasive or significant in its
outcomes. Unless it is part of a much broader and more cumulative strategy of
reasoning about the natural and social world then it will achieve relatively little.
This is true a fortiori in late modernity when belief in God is no longer the default
setting of western society. As Charles Taylor argues in A Secular Age, this is
the most profound difference between the contemporary world and the one that
preceded the Enlightenment. For us, faith is an ‘embattled option’ and it requires
not simply assent to one argument but the mustering of a broad set of intellectual
and practical commitments (Taylor 2007: 3). So any response to Hume will have
to widen the front of the argument. Secondly, even if faith can be maintained in the
stronger realist setting provided by Reidian philosophy, the effects of scepticism
may still prove significant. For Reid, the ineluctable principles by which our
thinking and action are regulated are given for the negotiation of embodied life
in the natural and social world. Our knowledge does not extend much further. At
best, we can live ‘wisely in the darkness’ with just sufficient awareness of God’s
ways (Wolterstorff 2004). The creeds and ceremonies of faith have a practical
function in orienting us towards love of God, self and neighbour. They may
carry cognitive commitments but these are limited in scope and imprecise in what
they affirm. This may point to one of the abiding benefits of Hume’s scepticism,
even for the faithful. The limitations of theological reason can thus serve
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the cause of a moral religion, devotional practice, tolerance and ecclesiastical
self-criticism.8
The banishment of God in Hume’s philosophy is an urbane achievement with
neither dramatic nor tragic nor wistful consequences. This sets him apart from
other European thinkers, in both theological and philosophical traditions. Luther’s
failure to locate God in worldly processes led to a sense of estrangement. The
Deus absconditus, the absent God, generated an existential tension that was
only resolved by the figure of the suffering Christ. The ways of the crucified
God eluded those of philosophy and religion. At least since Kant, the German
theological tradition has generally been dismissive of the standard arguments of
natural theology claiming that its failure only points to the real location of God in
human history and experience. Of course, there is nothing of this in Hume. Claims
to revelation are equally suspect with little attention being given in his writings
to the figure of Jesus. By contrast, other forms of agnosticism and atheism have
a different tonality in later western philosophy. Nietzsche dramatises the death
of God in modernity, seeing this as a difficult and heroic act with far-reaching
consequences. In late Victorian England, agnosticism may have been the default
setting for many intellectuals but it is presented wistfully, with nostalgic and
elegiac elements, in writers such as Matthew Arnold and Thomas Hardy. Even
within the tradition of British empiricism, Bertrand Russell’s atheism is of a more
strident and dramatic form with its rhetoric of ‘unyielding despair’. For Hume, by
contrast, the criticism of religion is a quietly therapeutic exercise for those willing
to take the trouble. It need not induce existential Angst, cosmic despair or moral
nihilism. More redolent of the ancient world, his mitigated scepticism will prevent
these from gaining purchase. The lesson of his philosophy, particularly his moral
theory, is that one can live and act well without regard to God. On balance, it will
be better for us if we are not obstructed or misled by the prejudices of faith.
In terms of the history of philosophy, Hume’s position is a minority
one. Kant and Hegel sought to reintroduce God, albeit in ways that were
judged heterodox. Like Spinoza before him, Hegel was described as ‘God-
intoxicated’. Wittgenstein, whose views on religion were admittedly elusive,
appears nevertheless to allow that religious discourse has an important role to
play in expressing insights and commitments that cannot otherwise be stated. It is
more akin to a box of tools that enable us to adopt and inhabit perspectives without
which our lives would be impoverished, lacking a certain depth, discernment and
openness to the transcendent. But there is nothing in Hume which suggests that
even a regulative account of religious language and practice might have some real
advantages over other philosophies. The intention appears to be one of dispelling
its irrational and baleful hold over human beings, as opposed to assimilating it
within a naturalist framework.
We can speculate about the contextual factors that contributed to this. Unlike
Boswell, Hume was someone who appeared able to live and die well, without
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any recourse to religious sentiments, rituals or hopes. His criticism of religion is
not that of someone who craves faith but cannot find it, or who feels keenly the
absence of a rational creed. He suffers no religious crisis after the swift loss of
faith in his adolescence. Another factor may also be the religion of his early 18th
century upbringing in the Scottish lowlands, in the wake of the violence of the
covenanting era. The Reformed theology and worship of the period must have
appeared ‘gey dreich’ to someone entering upon the exciting intellectual world of
the early Enlightenment. It would take another 150 years before Scottish church
life embarked upon a systematic renewal of its worship, sacramental practice,
preaching, music and church architecture to bring it closer to the Anglicanism
seemingly preferred by Hume (Cheyne 1983). Yet Hume does not adopt the
emerging moderate position of Hutcheson and many of those clergy who became
his friends and supporters. His indifference to religion and its institutions sets him
at a distance from most of the other thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, with
the possible exception of Adam Smith. That other great critic of 18th Presbyterian
church life, Robert Burns, was a younger contemporary of Hume. He exposed
the hypocrisy of the ‘unco guid’ and generally set his face against the prevailing
orthodoxy, but without it seems abandoning religion altogether. There are many
more positive religious notes in Burns than in Hume.
Others have read Hume as a man ahead of his time. In the writings of the so-
called new atheists today, he has come into his own. Richard Dawkins assumes
that a cocktail of Hume and Darwin will prove lethal for all forms of religion. The
multifaceted attack of Hume on religion is replicated, if intensified in much of this
literature. Dawkins follows many of Hume’s standard criticisms of the standard
proofs for God’s existence. The citation of the problem of evil bears similarities
to Parts X and XI of the Dialogues. The attack on sacred texts as populated with
miracle stories and unedifying tales is reminiscent of Hume’s famous essay on the
subject, while the claim of Christopher Hitchens that ‘religion poisons everything’
in its individual and social effects recalls much in the Natural History and other
works (Dawkins 2006; Hitchens 2007).
Nevertheless, despite their obvious alliances, there are probably two related
ways in which Hume would have been uneasy around the new atheism. Its
confident assertion of the non-existence of God might appear an overreaching
of the power of reason. Much of Hume’s criticism is that our experience is too
limited to enable us to pronounce over questions surrounding the origin of the
universe. Peter Atkins’ inflated claim that we should expect science eventually to
answer the question ‘why there is something rather than nothing?’ would have
been unlikely to secure the support of Hume (Atkins 2011: 12ff.). There may be
many questions that remain incapable of resolution, given our human condition.
The capacity of science to produce a new metaphysics might have been greeted
with a similarly sceptical response. The remarkable credulity displayed around
the explanatory concept of memes would surely have elicited some doubts on
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Hume’s part. At the same time, the tonality of the new atheism might also have
disturbed Hume, particularly its tendency to scoff at religionists as either fools
or knaves. Dawkins often writes as if exponents of faith should be creationists,
fundamentalists and biblical literalists for the sake of consistency. He is reluctant
to enter into conversation with revisionist positions which offer alternative
constructions in ways that seek the co-existence of religion and science. Hume’s
Dialogues by contrast are a model of interpretation in optimam partem. His
opponents, especially Cleanthes, are given a fair and sympathetic hearing. The art
of civilised conversation and friendly disagreement is exemplified, even when the
differences run deep. For that reason, the rhetorical strategies of the new atheists
with their strident and condescending overtones would probably have elicited
some rebuke from Hume himself.
Hume might have preferred to position himself alongside other humanist
voices who have urged the need for collaboration between advocates of tolerance,
civility and social justice whatever their religious hue. At the risk of frivolous
anachronism, we might ask what would Hume have made of buses in London and
Edinburgh parading the message, ‘There’s probably no God. Now stop worrying
and enjoy your life.’ Is this the public triumph of scepticism or the nadir of a
reflective secular humanism? It is hard to see Hume disagreeing much with the
content of that slogan. Its light and urbane tone is more Humean than Nietzschean.
Yet the medium might have offended him rather more. Is this just too vulgar, a
descent into sloganizing rather than arguing? Is there an atheist fanaticism that
also has its bad consequences? Is this likely to induce the calm and measured
discussion on the subject which he urged upon his critics? Or is it indeed a strategy
that might prove counter-productive by triggering a reflux of intemperate religious
enthusiasm? With his scepticism about the inevitability of human progress, Hume
might have entertained that prospect.
Finally, what of Hume’s reception amongst later Scottish philosophers and
theologians? My impression is that later generations, including scholars who
identified broadly with the Kirk, have learned to value Hume and have sought
to include him in a noble tradition of distinctively Scottish philosophers. Cairns
Craig points out that the late-19th century reading of Hume located him within a
Scottish tradition that was no longer fundamentally at odds with Hutcheson and
Reid (Craig 2009: 91–95). Henry Calderwood and James Orr, both products of
the United Presbyterian Church, wrote sympathetic studies at the turn of the 19th
century, even if Calderwood sought implausibly to identify the real Hume with
Cleanthes (Calderwood 1898; Orr 1903). Hume’s scepticism contributed to the
refining of faith, thus playing a positive role, albeit in ways that he himself did
not directly intend. Kemp Smith, who remained a theist of sorts, wrote one of
the finest studies of Hume’s philosophy and sought to position him close to Reid
in his espousal of a philosophical naturalism (Kemp Smith 1941). The Divinity
Faculties in Scotland ensured for many years that the Dialogues remained a
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prescribed text. Scottish theologians, it seems, took some pride in the view that
while Hume may have been a sceptic, he was at least their sceptic and better than
any of the others out there. For that reason amongst others, he deserves to be better
known and valued in contemporary Scotland. His nuanced criticism of religion
should enable us to think twice, to realise the danger of believing too much in the
wrong things, to remain alert to the follies and prejudices of the faithful, aware
of the mobility of religious forms across history, while listening patiently to those
who see the world differently in the expectation that we will profit from them.
As a critic of religion, Hume deserves to be eulogised in his native land at
least as much as Robert Burns. Although the toast to the immortal memory of
the mitigated sceptic is an intriguing prospect, it is unlikely that we shall ever
have Hume Suppers. Yet at least he is worthy of greater public recognition than
he currently receives. But as the ferryman at the Styx informed him, these things
take a long time.
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notes
1 This essay was originally presented as an address at the 38th Hume Society Conference
in Edinburgh, 2011. I am grateful to colleagues at that event for comments offered, and
also to an unpublished lecture by Willem Lemmens on ‘The Piety of the Sceptic: Hume
on ‘True Religion’ and Atheism’ delivered at the Institute for the Advanced Study of the
Humanities, University of Edinburgh, November, 2011 from which I have also benefited.
2 For discussion of the Beattie affair, see Mossner (1954), pp. 577ff. Despite his cheap
attack on Hume’s scepticism, Beattie, a determined abolitionist, deserves some credit
for exposing the flaws in Hume’s notorious comments on national characteristics. See
also Eze (1997).
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3 Whether Hume goes all the way in arguing transcendentally that moral qualities cannot
be ascribed to God, as Thomas Holden (2010) has recently claimed, seems less clear.
4 Here I am largely following the line of Kemp Smith in Hume (1935), p. 24.
5 This largely accords with the readings of Kemp Smith in Hume (1935) and Broadie
(2009). Much light is shed on how and why Hume held to such a position by Garrett
(2012). Garrett points out that the true religion espoused by Philo (and Hume) suffers
from a lack of determinate probability in relation both to the degree of resemblance
between divine and human intelligence and also to the existence of the former. Thus
Hume’s epistemic claim at the close of the Dialogues is authentic but highly modest.
6
‘Diverse judgements and expressions within this range may result from mere blameless
differences in philosophical temperament – such as the notable differences between
Cleanthes and Philo. These differences need not and should not breed animosity or
hinder friendship, in Hume’s view.’ (Garrett 2012: 218)
7 Immerwahr (1996: 333) notes that this passage is adapted in a speech of Cleanthes
in Dialogues, Part XII. Philo appears to accept the proposition, adding that only
the philosophical and rational kind of religion can function in this way. For further
exploration of what Hume intends by ‘true’ religion, see Lorne Falkenstein (2009).
8 This echoes earlier remarks of Principal Robertson to James Beattie defending the
religious benefits of Hume’s scepticism. ‘[A] little fluctuation, now and then, to the
sceptical side, tends perhaps to humble the Pride of Understanding, and to check bigotry;
and the consequences as to practice, I am enclined to think, are not very great.’ Cited by
Mossner, 1954: 580.
85
